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Abstract
Introduction: The Covid‐19 pandemic has required coun-
tries to prepare their health workforce for a rapid increase
of patients. This research aims to analyse the planning and
health workforce policies in Germany, a country with a
largely decentralised workforce governance mechanism.
Methods: Systematic search between 18 and 31 May 2020
at federal and 16 states on health workforce action and
planning (websites of ministries of health, public health
authorities), including pandemic preparedness plans and
policies. The search followed World Health Organisation
(WHO) Europe's health workforce guidance on Covid‐19.
Content analysis was performed, informed by the themes
of WHO.
Results: The pandemic preparedness plans consisted of no
or limited information on how to expand and prepare the
health workforce during pandemics. The 16 states varied
considerably regarding implementing strategies to expand
health workforce capacities. Only one state adopted a
policy on task‐shifting despite a federal law on task‐shifting
during pandemics.
Conclusions: Planning on the health workforce, its capacity
and skill‐mix during pandemics was limited in the pandemic
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response plans. Actions during the peak of the pandemic
varied considerably across states, were implemented ad
hoc and with limited planning. Future action should focus
on integrated planning and evaluation of workforce
policies.
K E YWORD S
Covid‐19, decentralised governance, Germany, health workforce,
skill‐mix, surge capacity
1 | INTRODUCTION
The Covid‐19 pandemic has put many health systems under pressure across the world. A first wave hit most
countries in the spring of 2020, followed by a second wave in the winter of 2020/2021. Although nearly all
countries worldwide were and are affected, the extent varied considerably. As of 11 November 2020, the highest
number of total infections existed in the following six countries: the United States (US), India, Brazil, France, Russia
and Spain.1,2 Other countries, such as Italy, showed high numbers of severe cases in short periods of time in
regional hotspots, such as in Lombardy region.3,4 Country responses to the Covid‐19 pandemic have been shown to
vary, but often included several measures to avoid transmission and to increase health system capacity. Health
system capacity is closely linked to a country's health workforce capacity and sustainability.5–7 According to the
World Health Organisation (WHO), a well‐trained health workforce in sufficient numbers with the possibility for
expanding capacity is critical for an effective response to Covid‐19, among other health system‐related factors.8
Many countries experienced acute shortages of health professionals to treat the high number of patients with
Covid‐19. In the US, several hospitals in New York City reacted to staff shortages and expanded their workforce.
Measures included redeployment and training of existing staff, hiring private staffing agencies and making use of
volunteers.7 In Italy, a shortage of health professionals was reported as a result of years of austerity measures and
staff, for example, doctors migrating to other countries. This situation exacerbated, for instance in the Lombardy
region, when high numbers of patients with Covid‐19 had to be treated.3 As a response, rapid actions were un-
dertaken, such as redeployment of staff, hiring of foreign‐trained doctors, early graduation of students, among
others (ibid). Some measures were considered to ease restrictive regulations in the US to allow new skills‐mixes and
task‐shifting, but progress was overall small.9
The WHO Regional Office for Europe has provided recommendations for countries to strengthen health
systems, including training, repurposing and mobilising sufficient health professionals during the Covid‐19
pandemic.8 Measures include identification of free health workforce available for surge capacity, skill‐mix and
repurposing of health professionals for rapid deployment, addressing contractual changes such as adjustment of
working hours (e.g., part to full time) and scope of work, maintaining ongoing communication with health pro-
fessionals, and protecting the physical health and safety of the frontline workers.8 A cross‐country comparison of
36 countries in Europe and Canada found several workforce‐related policy measures taken to support the health
workforce and overcome staff shortages.5 Examples include additional financial compensation or bonuses, mental
health support, as well as practical support such as childcare or free transport (ibid). The authors found that overall,
evaluations were lacking to determine the effectiveness of the interventions. Another study across 44 countries in
Europe and Canada described measures to expand the health workforce. Common strategies were to augment the
capacity of available health professionals and the recruitment of medical and nursing students.10 An OECD report
identified large cross‐country variations in the policy responses to the epidemic.11 Countries that were found to
react effectively during the spring of 2020 were Finland, Norway and Estonia from within Europe. Suggested
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reasons were geographical features such as lower population density, the rapid implementation of containment
strategies as well as trust and adherence to these measures by citizens. In Finland, shortages of medical materials
and supplies were prevented because of sufficient stockpiling (ibid).
In Germany, the first Covid‐19 case was confirmed on 27 January 2020.12 Within the following four months
until the end of May, measures were planned and implemented at federal and regional level. During this time the
Federal Ministry of Health suggested hospitals to recruit more staff and to cancel elective procedures to increase
the capacities to take care of patients with Covid‐19.13 Health professionals in hospitals had to adapt quickly to the
new circumstances. A qualitative study based on views of nursing managers and nurses specialized in hospital
hygiene showed that skill‐mix had changed and additional training was needed (among others).14 Health pro-
fessionals are at high risk for being infected; as of May 2020, an over proportional number of all infected persons
worked in hospitals, medical practices, dialysis facilities and emergency services (7%).15
The Global Health Security (GHS) index of 195 countries analysed country responses to epidemics. It showed
large differences in countries' capacities to react to infectious disease outbreaks.16 Germany ranked 14th overall
globally, based on six indicators: prevention, early protection, rapid response, health system capacity, national
policy capacity and risk environment. Yet, Germany ranked only 22nd in terms of health system response. This
ranking is based on countries' overall capacity to react to biological threats, including infectious disease outbreaks,
and was not specific to Covid‐19.
There is a paucity of research on countries' health workforce responses to Covid‐19.17 The two mentioned
cross‐country comparisons and the OECD report covered health workforce strategies from an international
perspective drawing early lessons,5,10,11 but lacked in‐depth analyses of individual country responses. All three
studies looked at primarily federal‐level responses to the pandemic. Yet, many countries, such as Belgium, Canada,
Germany, Italy and the US, have a devolved, decentralised governance of their health systems, including during
times of pandemics and health crises. There is limited research analysing the responses of countries with decen-
tralised governance systems. According to Greer et al.18 an in‐depth analysis of policy, politics and governance
systems of individual countries is required to understand countries' responses to the pandemic.
The aim of this article was to analyse Germany's response as a large, highly populated country with a
decentralised health system governance during the first wave of the Covid‐19 pandemic, taking account of policies
and actions planned and implemented at the federal level and by the states. Germany consists of 16 states with a
ministry of health each, plus a Federal Ministry of Health.19 Key actors include the public health authorities which
are available at the federal, state and municipality level. The responsibilities at state level concern public health,
such as the prevention and control of communicable diseases, including during pandemics, and other health‐related
decisions, for instance on inpatient care.20 The Federal Ministry of Health provides overall guidance, for instance,
by means of laws (e.g., the infection control law) and directives, which are then adopted by the states. The Robert‐
Koch‐Institute (RKI) serves as the government's central scientific institution on public health and pandemic re-
sponses. Hence, Germany is an example of a country with a devolved, multilevel governance system.
2 | METHODS
The study is based on a systematic search at federal and regional levels of all 16 states on health workforce action
and planning regarding the Covid‐19 pandemic during the first wave which took place in the spring of 2020,
following WHO's guidance on health workforce responses.8
This article focusses on two thematic areas derived from the WHO's guidance: (i) increase in workforce ca-
pacity and (ii) skill‐mix and task‐shifting. The two thematic areas were chosen, because they comprise key elements
to strengthen surge capacity and flexibility of the health workforce during epidemics. According to the WHO,
increase in workforce capacity includes temporary measures such as expanding working hours, reallocation of staff
from nonaffected areas, employment of retirees, medical and nursing students, military and nonpracticing
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healthcare workers (ibid). Skill‐mix and task‐shifting are defined as changing roles, tasks and competencies of health
professionals (skill‐mix) and shifting tasks and roles from a higher to a lower qualified health professional (task‐
shifting). The two concepts encompass among others rapid training (up‐skilling) of workers, expanding scope of
practice for health care workers, implementation of supervision structures, but also expedite training and early
certification for medical and nursing students (ibid). The aim was to identify if and to what extent Germany
implemented the strategies at federal and state level.
The websites of the federal and state ministries of health and public health authorities were systematically
accessed and searched for any of the two above‐mentioned thematic areas. To this end, the websites were
screened, and all written documentation systematically analysed, including (i) the pandemic preparedness plans
and (ii) policies and other measures specific to the health workforce. First, the pandemic preparedness plans were
included in the analysis to assess if and to which extent the health workforce was taken into account in the
planning phase prior to the pandemic. Second, the search also encompassed legal documents (laws, bylaws,
decrees) and other policies mentioned on the federal or regional levels if directly related to the health workforce
and Covid‐19. Inclusion criteria were information provided in written form directly on the websites or via hy-
perlinks. Excluded were information provided in video, audio or exclusively on social media. Snowballing was
applied in addition to the systematic search, which involved following hyperlinks to other websites or docu-
mentation if assessed as directly related to the topics of interest. The search was performed by three researchers
after a pilot phase, which was applied to ensure that all researchers followed the same procedure. During the
pilot phase a selection of three states was chosen to test the search strategy, discuss uncertainties and seek
consensus.
The final searchwas carried out between 18 and 31May 2020, whichwas towards the end of the firstwave of the
pandemic. The timing was deemed appropriate, as most Covid‐19 related workforce policies and measures taken
during the first wave were available on the websites by then. Each researcher conducted the search for five or six
states, respectively, and extracted the findings in a condensed form including references in an Excel template which
was based on theWHO's topics. The search on federal level policies and measures and pandemic preparedness plans
was conducted by one researcher. As the content of websites can change over time, all sources were saved during the
search.
Content analysis was performed, informed by the themes of WHO, using a deductive approach (themes and
subthemes are defined a priori). The underlying contents were extracted in a consolidated Excel file by themes,
double checked and grouped by the thematic areas of WHO. Specifically, each of the pandemic preparedness plans,
as well as Covid‐19 specific policy and other measures were analysed as follows: first, assessment if the material
was Covid‐19 related, second, content‐analysis of the documents on the health workforce, which was included if
covering workforce capacity and/or skill‐mix. For the pandemic preparedness plans, all content related to Covid‐19
and the health workforce on workforce capacity expansion, skill‐mix and task‐shifting was extracted, as well as
planning with reference to WHO's human resources in health scenario. WHO provides a checklist for the man-
agement for pandemic influenza (which includes aspects related to health service personnel). The checklists
recommend recruiting retirees, nonpracticing healthcare professionals, volunteers, and to create plans for minimum
staffing levels.21,22 The pandemic preparedness plans were analysed separately as they were an indication of plans
ahead of epidemics in contrast to the remaining gathered data that includes measures taken (policies, other) during
the Covid‐19 pandemic. Third, the material identified during the search was grouped within the two thematic areas
by subthemes (i) workforce capacity: expansion of work hours, recruitment of additional personnel within and
outside the health sector, reassignment and reallocation of staff, and support measures (e.g., child care); (ii) skill‐mix
and task‐shifting: existence of a policy on task‐shifting, training and/or education regarding Covid‐19. In a final step,
the findings were compared by themes and subthemes across states and in relation to the federal level in order to
identify the extent to which measures were similar or divergent across states and the extent to which federal
policies and measures were taken up in the regions.
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3 | RESULTS
The analysis covered the websites of the Federal Ministry of Health and the public health authority (RKI), as well as
the websites of the respective ministries and public health authorities of the 16 states. All states had pandemic
preparedness plans and websites with information on Covid‐19 related policies and measures available.
3.1 | Pandemic preparedness plans
In Germany, pandemic preparedness plans exist at the federal and state levels. The federal pandemic preparedness
plan has been developed by the RKI, for any health‐related pandemic and was supplemented with a Covid‐19
specific section.23–25 Each state had a pre‐existing pandemic preparedness plan and most refer to the federal plan
and focus on a possible influenza (H1N1) pandemic. The states varied in the extent to which the plans covered
Covid‐19; seven included Covid‐19 (see Table 1).
The health workforce is mentioned in all 16 states and in the federal preparedness plans. Four state pre-
paredness plans refer to health workforce planning according to the WHO scenarios described in checklists for
pandemic influenza.21,22 Lower Saxony was the only state with a staffing plan (overview of number of health
workers but no minimum staffing levels).33 The federal and all state pandemic preparedness plans (except Berlin)
have included measures to increase the workforce capacity. The plans offer several and diverse strategies to
expand the health workforce, but some suggested actions have been mentioned by several states: recruitment of
students/workers in training (6 states), cancelling of elective procedures (6/federal), cohort care (continuous care of
infected/not infected patients by the same staff) (6/federal), reallocation of staff from other units (7/federal),
recruitment of retirees (4), early discharge of patients (3), recruitment of volunteers or temporary staff (4), and use
capacities of rehabilitation clinics (4). See Supporting Information Materials S1 for more detail.
Skill‐mix and task‐shifting was not mentioned directly in any of the states, but indirectly addressed by 13 plans
and covered training of health workforce (12/federal) and some suggest reallocation of staff from other units or
specialty areas (7/federal).
Some of the states have identified additional measures impacting indirectly on the health workforce. In Bremen
only urgent or emergency cases were suggested to be admitted for inpatient care, and nursing home care shall be
undertaken by relatives.30 Hesse's and Lower Saxony's plans suggest to have an on‐call duty activated that allows
for mobile patient care at home by physicians.32,33 In Mecklenburg‐Vorpommern, federal army hospitals were
suggested to be used to increase capacities.34 Rhineland‐Palatinate's plan describes the recruitment of ‘external
personnel’,36 and in Saarland medical teams by the Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians are
planned to be on duty to support practicing health professionals.37
3.2 | Policies and measures to expand workforce surge capacity
All 16 states have introduced measures to expand the health workforce, yet, they varied considerably (see Table 2).
One strategy was to expand the working hours per day. In Germany, the working hours act (Arbeitszeitgesetz
[ArbZG]) determines the maximum eligible working hours per day and week, including rest times. An amendment of
the working hours act (ArbZG sect. 14 para. 4) by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and a decree
(COVID‐19‐ArbZV) was enacted in five states. Four states extended the maximum working hours explicitly to 12 h/
day.42–46 In Rhineland‐Palatinate, the focus was on expanding working hours for staff in nursing homes and mobile
long‐term care services, a setting with staff shortages already prior to the pandemic.47,48
Eight states implemented measures beyond the practicing health professionals. This included attracting retirees
(e.g., medical doctors, nurses) back to the workforce, recruiting medical students and providing licenses for foreign‐
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trained health care professionals. Three states initiated measures to recruit retirees back to the workforce.47,49–52 In
five regionsmedical studentswere identifiedas a resource to support the healthworkforce and tobe recruited.50,53–55
Three states provided temporary licenses for physicians trained in Poland to solve a problem of recognition of Polish
degrees thatexistedat thesame time.56–59Active recruitmentofPolishphysicians for thepurposeofCovid‐19wasnot
described.Rhineland‐Palatinateauthorisedworkpermissions for foreigntrainednurseswaiting forrecognitionof their
diplomas to work as nursing assistants.60 Bavaria identifiedmultiple measures to expand workforce capacity and was
the only state that considered recruiting health professionals on parental leave.49,50,61–64Medical students in Bavaria
wererecruitedbymultiplechannelsonstateandfederal level, for instancebyajointcalloftheMinistryofHealthandthe
BavarianMedical Association but also by a nationwide call of the RKI.65
Eight states started measures to recruit nonpracticing healthcare workers. Of those, five states explicitly
recruited nurses, two focused on physicians and five advertised for health professions in general.49,61–63,66,67 At
federal level no initiative was identified to recruit nurses but the online platform ‘Pflegereserve’ (care reserve) was
mentioned as this platformwas used in several states to recruit nurses. Rhineland‐Palatinate and Schleswig‐Holstein
are examples of the few states inGermanywith anursing chamber anda register of nurses, andofferednursesworking
outside the health care sector to register.68,69
Seven states used the strategy reassignment and/or reallocation of staff to increase health workforce capac-
ities. Most often the reallocation was applied within hospitals in combination with cancelling elective procedures
which freed up staff for the care and treatment of patients with Covid‐19.50,51,68,70–72 In Lower Saxony staff from
the Medical Review Board of the Statutory Health Insurance Funds (MDK) supported nursing homes as auditing
tasks of the MDK were stopped during this time.70 In Rhineland‐Palatinate an exchange of staff across nursing
homes and home care service was described to secure the care of care recipients in both settings.48 In Mecklen-
burg‐Vorpommern ‘fever outpatient clinics’ were implemented in order to protect and release pressure from the
ambulatory care setting, which was in Germany mostly the first point of contact for patients with symptoms.73 In
Mecklenburg‐Vorpommern regional hospital clusters were established and the opportunity to reallocate staff
within each cluster was mentioned.74 At federal level, the reallocation of staff was supported implicitly as hospitals
received financial compensation of 560€/day for unoccupied beds (the reference year 2019), so that staff can focus
more on patients with Covid‐19. This measure was determined with an amendment of the Hospital Financing Act
(Krankenhausfinanzierungsgesetz), time‐bound until September 2020.75 Two other measures are time‐bound
(determined in the respective decrees): expansion of working hours (period of few months) and licenses for foreign
trained staff (up to spring 2021).
In all 16 states, additional support measures were implemented, mainly the provision of day care for children of
health professionals (identified as ‘system‐relevant professions’, in addition to children from firefighters, school
teachers, supermarket personnel and others).76 Even though the measure was implemented in all states, each state
had its own decrees and there was no federal regulation. In addition, three states offered day care for health
professionals with dependent, frail family members.77–79
Three states made use of additional support measures to expand workforce capacities. German armed forces
provided support in nursing homes (Hamburg) and with contact tracing (Brandenburg). In Bavaria, civil servant
candidates also worked in contact tracing teams.52,80,81 The German Red Cross supported nursing homes in
Hamburg with testing residents and staff.82
3.3 | Policies on task‐shifting
At federal level, the infection control law (§ 5a) authorises task‐shifting in case of nationwide epidemics83 (Table 3).
According to the law, task‐shifting of medical tasks is authorised to nurses and emergency paramedics indepen-
dently under the following conditions: the competencies must be available to carry out tasks independently,
adequate documentation is required, the professional must inform the responsible or treating physician and the
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care is performed for patients with no severe conditions. There was no additional information what specific tasks
the law covers, how the competencies should be assessed and by whom and how task‐shifting should be imple-
mented in practice.
At state level, only Saxony‐Anhalt further specified the infection control law (§ 5a) and adopted a joint decree
that provided additional information supplementing the federal law for emergency paramedics. It states that
emergency paramedics possess the competencies (as per emergency paramedics law) and as per treatment path-
ways and standard operating procedures to perform certain medical tasks independently during pandemics. It is
highlighted that each paramedic should only perform tasks and skills as per personal abilities and skills acquired,
which depends on the work experience and additional training. These skills are to be determined a priori by the
medical director of the rescue service. If task‐shifting has occurred in practice, adequate and immediate commu-
nication and documentation to a medical doctor is required, for example, the director of the rescue service and/or
responsible physician in a hospital to which the patient is transported.84
No further information was identified on task‐shifting from physicians to nurses (as covered in the federal law),
neither in Saxony‐Anhalt, nor in any of the other states.
All provisions under § 5 of the infection control law, including task‐shifting, are in place in light of Covid‐19
until 31 March 2021 and will be evaluated thereafter.85
One state, Rhineland‐Palatinate, has made provisions to specify task‐shifting in ambulatory long‐term care
from nurses to lower qualified staff, for example, nursing assistants (time‐bound until 31 March 2021). Specific
nursing tasks which are usually reserved to the nursing profession as well as basic nursing care can be delegated to
lower‐qualified staff at the discretion of the management if the competencies and expertise are available.
Table 3 shows training and education related to skill‐mix and task‐shifting. At the federal level, no information
was provided what the training and education requirements for nurses and paramedical staff should be regarding
the law on task‐shifting. In Saxony‐Anhalt, the law on task shifting from physicians to emergency paramedics (§ 5)
also referred to the training and competencies, which are to be covered by the standard basic education and
standard operating procedures.84
In Rhineland‐Palatine, training opportunities and financing directly related to upskilling within a profession
were provided via information for nurses and physicians in intensive care, to expand capacity in intensive care units
(ICUs). Training is offered by 24 institutions and financed by the state. There is a 180 h ‘rapid’ training in intensive
care nursing, with the overall aim to expand capacity for an additional 2000 beds.69,86 North Rhine‐Westphalia
focused on training of medical students to expand workforce capacity.87
Several states introduced provisions for the training or further education of health professionals, either
setting‐specific, profession‐specific or for all health professionals. It was not clear, however, if the training was also
partly related to skill‐mix, and therefore are marked as such in Table 3. Examples included training for staff working
in nursing homes. In Brandenburg for instance, training was operated via telephone hotlines by the MDK on Covid‐
19‐related content, such as isolation, hygiene, handling of suspected cases, among others.88 In Mecklenburg‐
Vorpommern, training focused on pharmacies and hygiene, isolation and suspected cases.89,90 In Schleswig Holstein,
training covered all staff, whereas in Rhineland‐Palatinate, suggestions focused on the training of nurses: training
(modules) were established by the regional nursing chamber and coordinated (in five educational institutions) plus
online resources.
4 | DISCUSSION
As a response to the Covid‐19 pandemic, Germany used various health workforce strategies to strengthen and
expand the workforce. This analysis shows that strategies varied largely across the 16 states. Most action was
applied on expanding health workforce capacities but limited on skill‐mix and task‐shifting. Pandemic preparedness
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plans exist in all 16 states and varied considerably. All covered health workforce to at least some extent, but most
were not very specific and the majority were not updated in light of the Covid‐19 situation.
Since 2005, all 16 states developed their own pandemic preparedness plans including state‐specific adjust-
ments.91 Only seven states made specific reference to Covid‐19 in the plans. No information was found why some
states updated their plans and others not and to which extent the plans were followed in the states' responses to
the pandemic and lessons learned. From experience with the influenza H1N1 in 2009, the RKI concluded that
Germany's ‘preparedness was largely in an advanced stage and most probably contributed to successful control’ of
the 2009 pandemic, however, communication and logistics of vaccines were topics most in need of improvement
(ibid). An evaluation of how well Germany and each state were prepared during the Covid‐19 pandemic, if pandemic
preparedness plans were implemented, and which measures have been effective in practice, should be considered
in future revaluations and for further research. An external evaluation of countries' preparedness to respond to
health emergencies is provided by the WHO's Joint External Evaluation (JEE), a tool recommended to all WHO's
member states to evaluate and monitor international health regulations capacity.92 Two‐thirds of all member states
completed or planned the JEE in 2019, and results are available for four EU countries.93,94 Germany has also
conducted the JEE in 2019 but the report has not published to date.95
There were marked differences between the states in the extent to which health professionals were covered in
the preparedness plans and workforce planning. It is unclear why there were these differences. It could be hy-
pothesized that states governed by political parties with a stronger role for planning resulted in preparedness plans
being more developed than in states governed by parties that emphasize a less intense role for the state. One
example is Bavaria which has planned and implemented a range of workforce measures and is traditionally gov-
erned by a conservative party. Other reasons may be differences in the public health tradition in the states and
expertise in workforce planning among the teams writing pandemic preparedness plans. There needs to be more
research into the underlying reasons for these differences across states.
An analysis of 43 European countries and Canada showed a variety of strategies to increase health workforce
capacity. For Germany five out of eight measures were identified and these results are in line with our study.
However, the study also showed that there were measures in place in other countries that were not applied in
Germany, for instance, recruitment of inactive health professionals and use of armed forces.10 In contrast, our
analysis shows that both strategies indeed were used in a few states, first, nonpracticing health professionals were
called to register at online platforms, second, armed forces supported the states Brandenburg and Hamburg. One
reason for the differences may be that the international study focused on measures at the federal level and those
implemented in many states, whereas our analysis provided a state‐by‐state analyses and was conducted somewhat
later, and more measures were in place at the time of search.
Our analysis is largely in line with the findings from the international OECD study, which showed Germany
mobilised healthcare students and foreign trained health workers.11 Both measures were not nationwide strategies
but applied in five (medical students) and three states (foreign health professionals), respectively. In the OECD
study, Germany was not listed regarding the following three measures: recruitment of retirees and nonpracticing
health workers, reallocation of staff to places with greater need, existing or new reserve list. The first two aspects
were, however, identified during our search. An official reserve list with available health professionals does not
exist in Germany. However, there were several options to register voluntarily, mainly for nonpracticing health
professionals and medical students. One example is the website of ‘Pflegereserve’ which was originated by
stakeholders such as ‘Deutscher Pflegerat’ (German nursing council). Nine states officially refer to this website.
Nurses, nursing associates and health care assistants can register but also hospitals and nursing homes which can
contact those registered in case of need.
Reallocation of staff within hospitals was a strategy mentioned in five states. This was often combined with the
cancellation of elective procedures which was reported by 72.4% of healthcare professionals surveyed (n = 2.827)
in Germany in spring 2020.96 Hence, freed up staff could take care of Covid‐19 patients. The shortage of staff on
ICUs is critical because reallocation may be more difficult as patients and tasks on ICU are more complex and
KÖPPEN ET AL. - 83
take‐over of tasks by nurses and physicians without training in intensive care is not fully applicable. In Germany, a
survey from 2017 among 446 physicians revealed that 22% of ICU floors had to close beds and the main reason
was a lack of trained ICU nurses.97
The Covid‐19 incidence levels per 100,000 inhabitants varied greatly among regions and districts in Germany
which led to large differences in the number of Covid‐19 patients in hospitals.98 Reallocation of staff across the
country from less affected to more affected areas could be an opportunity, but no information was identified that
this has taken place. In Mecklenburg‐Vorpommern it was mentioned that clusters of hospitals were established and
a cluster manager coordinates the ventilators and the required personnel.74
Limited action on skill‐mix and task‐shifting resembles the situation before the pandemic. A study by Maier and
Aiken99 showed that task‐shifting between the medical and nursing profession was limited in Germany in com-
parison with 38 other countries. The federal law on infectious control measures stipulates the possibility to
implement task‐shifting from physicians to emergency paramedics and nurses during Covid‐19. However, no state
further specified this law on nurses. Only one state, Saxony‐Anhalt, referred to this provision regarding emergency
paramedics. It is not known if and to which extent task‐shifting has occurred during the Covid‐19 pandemic and
how it has been implemented in practice. Task‐shifting has shown to occur informally in daily practice if there are
unmet need or care requirements, as shown in the Netherlands or Spain (ibid). It would be relevant for Germany to
analyse if this has been the case during the pandemic and how to strengthen the professions and collaborative care
in this regard.
Differences across states exist, as shown by the pandemic preparedness plans, expansion ofworkforce capacities,
and skill‐mix and task‐shifting. This represents the federal structure of Germany. One example how differently
measureswere implemented is the deployment ofmedical students—the location of work differed (hospitals or public
health institutes) and the tasks (support of patient care, contact tracing, perform Covid‐19 tests).
It is unclear why the measures differ considerably among the states, and whether the different approaches per
state have an overall impact on Germany's Covid‐19 response. Germany ranked only 22nd in terms of the category
health system response (including capacity in hospitals and personnel deployment) in the GHS index before the
Covid‐19 pandemic.16 The authors of the GHS index recommend that every country should have an updated ‘health
workforce strategy’ (ibid). However, case studies for Germany show a lack of an integrative health workforce
governance between federal and local levels.100 Another reason for different measures across states could be
coordination problems. This was described by Greer et al.101 for several federal countries, also for Germany
regarding workforce capacity. The authors describe potential solutions such as informal communication and co-
ordination between decision maker and transparency regarding decisions (ibid). In Germany, the federal govern-
ment, together with the 16 state representatives have discussed periodically Covid‐19 measures, but
implementation is the responsibility of the states and can be modified.
A limitation of our study is that not all relevant information may have been identified, for instance if not
provided on the websites studied or not findable. Furthermore, only a limited statement can be made on the extent
to which the measures have been implemented in practice. The search was conducted in May 2020 during the end
of the first wave of the pandemic, hence, can only provide information for this time period. The second wave to date
has shown more infections and patients being hospitalised and state measures may have been different and are still
partly ongoing, which are not covered in this study. Yet, the study is the first of its kind which has systematically
analysed state‐level responses on Covid‐19 from a health workforce perspective.
5 | CONCLUSION
This research demonstrated the importance to analyse not only federal but also in detail state level measures in
countries. Germany's states have implemented a range of different strategies to expand their health workforce
during the first wave of Covid‐19, covering extra working hours, retirees and student recruitment, among others.
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Many pandemic preparedness plans were not Covid‐19 specific and planning for health professional capacity
expansion was limited, as were strategies on skill‐mix and task‐shifting. Overall, there was little evidence of har-
monisation, evaluation and limited planning to expand health workforce capacity. These results are of relevance for
federal countries with a decentralised workforce governance structure. Lessons from Covid‐19 first wave should
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